

Gilgit Wazarat; 1947

Frontier Militia and the first coup d' etat in post-colonial South Asia

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Abstract.

In November 1947, Gilgit Scouts under a British officer rebelled against the Sikh governor and resultantly the Gilgit area acceded to Dominion of Pakistan. Consequently, it cut off the land routes not only between Russia and Dominion of India but also between Central and South Asia. This event is hailed as an act of patriotism by the natives and official historians. This paper argues that this independence was not an isolated affair of the natives, rather it had the blessings and support of the British officials as well.. British Forward Policy in India was cultured over decades by individual adventurous officers, with the lapse of paramountcy this Forward Policy was bound to die on the appointed day, but it did not; rather individual British officer steered it towards Pakistan through a coup d'état . This paper concludes, that , this coup d'etat was planned and executed by Frontier Officers only and did not had the support of the British Government . British India 'Forward Policy' did not elapsed on the appointed day rather by virtue of its inertia it lived on and was transferred to Pakistan .

Introduction; Last Chukker of Gilgit Game

On 1st November 1947 the Gilgit Scouts an all Muslim militia,ⁱ which was raised ,trained and commanded by the British officers, being paid by the Maharaja of Kashmir carried out a coup d'état under a British officer Major William Brown. Dogra governor Brigadier Ghansara Singh was arrested and Major Brown sent the accession of Gilgit Wazarat to Pakistan within hours. It was also a rebellion because these Gilgit Scouts attacked the 6th Jammu & Kashmir Regiment at Bumji . It was also a war of independence, as independence was unexpectedly proclaimed by the Gilgit Militia , with its own president and field marshal. Major William Brown who masterminded the Operation Datta Khelⁱⁱ, had in mysterious circumstances relinquished his King George's Commission a month after the announcement of independence plan and became a subject of Maharajah of Kashmir on the advice of his superiors (Brown,1994). This relinquishing of king's commission is the most unprecedented act since 1857 in British military traditions in India. The superior officers who had guided Major Brown to do this, all later opted alongwith Major Brownⁱⁱⁱ to serve in Pakistan Army.^{iv}

The lease of Gilgit Agency ^v surprisingly was revoked and on 1st August 1947, Union Jack was replaced by Kashmir flag. Thus this move of British just on the eve of transfer of power apparently seems to indicates an utter disengagement with the Forward Policy{Bruce,1900) yet events leading to 1st November 1947 clearly dictates that this was not the case . British however did maintained other political agencies^{vi} like Khyber , Mohmand, Kurram etc. therefore revoking only the Gilgit Agency is unusual.

This paper thus investigates the coup, with a hypothesis that, the act of coup d' etat was planned by the British officers in order to safeguard the Forward Policy. To establish whether the events at Gilgit were an exclusive Frontier Militia affair or it involved the central government also.

Literature Review

The literature review is primarily an interpretation of the history of the events. In the research field the Pakistan Higher Education Commission{HEC} has over 6000 approved thesis for the grant of Doctor of Philosophy{ Ph.D} Degree and yet only two deals with the Gilgit. Similarly the collection of Ph.D thesis in United Kingdom available on web have over 22 pages of index dealing with the word Kashmir and Pakistan and again none is about the Gilgit Revolt(ETHOS). The literature regarding the Gilgit Accession can be segregated into the categories originating from India, Pakistan, United Kingdom and Gilgit itself. Not surprisingly all have different versions of the event. Indians accuse British officers of betraying their oath, Pakistanis were not willing even to admit the very presence and participation of Major Brown (Pakistan White Paper,1977) , until his memoirs were published in 1994, he was then awarded recognition.. British tend to concentrate more on the Kashmir issue rather than the Gilgit(British Parliament 2004),'. Alaistar Lamb(1993) has his theory regarding the invasion of vale of Kashmir by the Indian military, 'The real goal ...was not the Vale of Kashmir but the Gilgit Agency'. Lamb observes 'Quite a number of British officers serving in the armed forces of both India and Pakistan unofficially involved themselves in early Kashmir operations to a degree that went far

beyond the bounds of benevolent neutrality...one example the affair of Major Brown and the Gilgit Agency.’

The Gilgitis themselves are not unanimous on the conduct of the whole episode. Almost all the key players have written their autobiographies narrating the tale; it is the years of their publishing which has caused much of difference. Lieutenant General {retired} Dr M.L. Chibber of Indian Army writes (Chibber,2004:55) ‘Major Brown was emotionally attached to Pakistan’. Same theme is adopted by other Indian writers, Major General Kuldeep Singh Bajwa{retired} writes (Bajwa,2004:22). ‘In the North, on 1st November 1947 British officers in the Gilgit Scouts staged a coup and handed over the strategic Gilgit Agency to Pakistan’. The official history of Indian Army notes(India Ministry of Defence,1987: 280) ‘ The British officers...proved themselves hostile to J&K government and took leading part in the pro-Pakistan treachery at Gilgit’. On the other hand Pakistan Army official history (Kashmir Campaign, 1970: 1-5) about the Kashmir events from 14th August 1947-June 1948 whose compilation started in 1954 redrafted in 1961 and finally published as a restricted issue only for armed forces of Pakistan admits that

‘no official records have been made public by both Pakistan and India...subject has been neglected by the historians...historians feel that this war confined to a rather secluded corner of this sub continent made little impact on contemporary world events.’

The history of Pakistan Army published in 1999 by Brigadier Brian Cloughely the Australian military attaché in Pakistan again fails to have even a paragraph on the events leading to the 1st November 1947 and again Major Brown fails to find any space in the book, although Cloughely was able to interview the surviving nun of Baramula. In the vernacular press and

publications the spotlight is on the native Muslim officers and troops, in the ‘Siachen Glacier The World Highest Battle Field’ written by Colonel Zakir in Urdu again attributes the accession of Gilgit to the Muslim elements of Gilgit Scouts.

Professor Ahmad Hassan Dani is the Professor Emeritus in Quaid –i-Azam University and in 1989 The National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research Islamabad sponsored a research into the ‘History of Northern Areas of Pakistan’ and to date is the most authenticated work. Professor Dani states about the events of November 1947

‘Who should be given the credit for achieving this success? The group of four army officers of the Kashmir State forces, viz Colonel Hassan, Colonel Syed Durrani, Major Muhammad Khan Jarral and Lieutenant Colonel Ghulam Haider Khan claim the exclusive monopoly for themselves....Colonel Hasan Khan claims to have planned the whole thing’.

Partition of India and Threat of Communism; clash between idealism and realism

Partition of India was not a planned affair , it came as a surprise and was made possible mainly due to the coming of Liberals in power in the post Second World War elections in 1946. It was in June 1947, that the independence plan was announced to the world and Indian public by the newly appointed Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten. The partition of India was not merely an act of idealism but it also carried the elements of realism. Russia and communism was a threat as grave then as Islamic fundamentalism is perceived today by the western world. ‘ Russia is our most probable potential threat...without which it would not be possible for us to fight at all would include India’ were the reports of British Chief of Staffs including Field Marshall Viscount Allenbrooke (Sarila,2005:.23). Mr Atlee’s policy and thinking was to avoid any clash

with Russian and to withdraw forces from all such areas including Middle East and India and to have a defence line across the Africa. He was the first to grasp the fragility of empire in post war era 'It is not a unit that can be defended by itself, it was the creation of sea power and with the advent of air power...empire scattered over five continents cannot be defended with a fleet based on island fortress, its gone' (Riste,ed,1985: 32).

Indian Congress which was the largest and most popular political party^{vii} had a soft corner for Russia and communism, they were already sharing the power alongwith Muslim League in India since 1946. There was little left to imagination of policy makers that , once having a total control of power, India will soon be a breeding ground for communism(Victor, 1969). This apprehension and appreciation was validated by the events in the post independence, India later signed pacts of friendship with Russia, and there were communist governments in the provinces of India most notably in Bengal. Muslim League on the other hand was a pro western and anti communist party, later years validated this hypothesis, Pakistan joined western orchestrated military alliances, granted military bases to USA , by and large adopted a strong anti communist internal and external policy.

On the highest level, British adopted a policy of being neutral in the partition process, yet they were fully aware of the future consequences if the events are allowed to proceed on the path of idealism. Thus they left no stone unturned in assuring that two provinces namely North Western Frontier Province and Balochistan, which were cardinal in establishing a strong fortification to keep Forward Policy intact ,should be part of Pakistan rather than remaining free or joining Dominion of India.. Thus in Balochistan Agency , the decision of joining either the dominion was influenced through the political agent, resultanty the Jirga agreed to join Pakistan.

In the NWFP, contrary to the existing rules of game, the decision of joining the dominion was sought through referendum , rather than through the provincial assembly as in vogue in other provincial assemblies. The major factor in this deviation was the fact that it was Congress which was in power in the NWFP at that time; resultantly Congress and its allies boycotted the referendum and this strategic province became part of Pakistan. (Transfer of Power 1942-7).

Gilgit – Geographical Pivot of Central and South Asian Civilisations

Gilgit alongwith Khyber Pass stands as the gateway to Central Asia or vice versa. Gilgit is the head of the North Western Frontiers of Subcontinent and South Asia. Situated at the remote corner at an elevation of 4500 feet, surrounded by no less than 32 peaks over 6500 meters within a radius of 65 miles (Imperial Gazeeter,1901). Close to Gilgit the three great mountain ranges namely Himalayas, Karakorum and Hindu Kush joins , thus Gilgit is the fault line of Indus and Oxus Civilisation.{John Keay,1979. Munphool,1870)}.

Gilgit is also known as Shinkai, Shina and Dardistan , inhabited by people who are regarded as unwarlike, mild and peace-loving (Gazetteer: 1907). In 1889, British established a political agency at Gilgit, later in 1891-92, chain of events at the frontier erupted into a small war in which the neighbouring states of Hunza and Nagar were militarily reduced into submission to the crown (Durand, 1899}. Gilgit is located twenty odd miles on the west bank of River Indus, thus it is the bridge over Indus and he who controls Gilgit controls the passage and crossing over Indus. Gilgit is a small mountainous town, whose history is shrouded in mystery and is derived from oral traditions, however in 1861, Kashmir state was able to establish its foothold and rule over the Gilgit and named it as Gilgit Wazarat. This wazarat apart from Gilgit also included a number of small republics namely Tangir, Darrel, Thor, Gor, Kningah, Hoder, Bunar, Thak,

Giche and Butogarh. The population of Gilgit in 1901 was approximately 60,000 , dispersed in 260 odd villages. There are few small principalities in the near vicinity of Gilgit , which includes Yasin, Ishkoman and Punial. Gilgit was strategically important as it borders with Badakshan on west, Sinkiang on east and leads to Tashkent in north. In 1901, a weekly postal service was in operation between Gilgit and Kashgar . From 1890, the Kashmir state and the British had an opposing view on the status of these small republics, where as Kashmir darbar maintained that they are part of Kashmir, the British refuted the claims, highlighting that although they are under the sovereignty of Kashmir yet they are not part of Kashmir (Imperial Gazetteer, 1907. Bangash , 2015.p.139).

Great Game, Forward Policy & Frontier Militia

Great Game started in 1820's with first two chukkers^{viii} resulting in first {1839-1842} and second Afghan {1878-1880} Wars. Prime Ministers, Disraeli and Gladstone had varying policy on countering the Russian threat, one school of thought favoured a 'Forward Policy' which promoted an aggressive posture having British military contingents stationed as far forward as possible there by making Afghanistan a dependency of British India, the other school of thought favoured an isolationist policy 'Masterly Inactivity' , there by rejecting the very idea of any Russian invasion to India as not practical, they considered River Indus as an viable and economical defence line, in the end it was Forward Policy that emerged winner.

Before the third chukker{1919,Third Anglo Afghan War} the British had moved extreme north in Hindu Kush some 300 miles north of Khyber Pass. The two more vital passes Baroghul and Ishkoman connects India with Central Asia , as it was not economically viable to garrison

the British troops next to the passes thus the historical communication hubs like Chitral for Baroghul pass route and Gilgit for the Ishkoman became strategic in nature. Gilgit was more strategic in importance because it connects to China, Afghanistan and Kashmir, it was the starting point of Himalayas.^{ix} Britain thus engineered the western borders of Afghanistan; Russians also agreed on having a clear sphere of influence, a treaty was signed with Russia on the extent of spheres of both empires in 1873{ which later became the boundary between Afghanistan and Russia} on one hand and between India and Afghanistan the Durand Line in 1893, with China the northern boundary was agreed in 1913. It is close to Gilgit that these four empires British India, China and Afghanistan meet with a strip of sixty miles of Afghanistan in Wakhan separating India and Russia. (Anita, 1985).

Over period of time the objectives of forward policy remained identical, the safeguarding of India's north western approach from Russia and preserving the sanctity of the Durand Line. Gilgit Agency which represented the Gilgit town and adjoining half a dozen small states was established in 1889. British used military power to establish their garrisons and writ in these far flung remote mountainous terrain with a focus to keep the passes under observation. In the process, British carried out considerable military expeditions to subjugate the independent small but strategically important states of Hunza and Nagar which in fact defined the western end or the starting point of the Durand Line. Gilgit Levies the forerunner to Gilgit Scouts were raised in this period.

Frontier Militia; Gilgit Scouts

Gilgit Scouts played the key role in the success of the coup; it was part of Frontier Corps of Militia, Rifles & Scouts.^x Frontier and militia are both synonym to each other, frontier implies

a stretch of territory which is unchartered and above all where the life is tough and demands the best out of a man in order to survive. The very first militia on north western frontier was raised in 1879 at Khyber as 'Khyber Jezailchis', (Khyber Rifles archives) a decade later in 1889, Levies were raised at Gilgit. The very concept of Militia originated in England in 1641, it implies where the native population is entrusted with the defence of their homeland. The concept of Militia was first advocated by Nicola Machiavelli (Machiavelli, Art of War, 1520), however it was in USA that it prospered, with elaborate rules and regulations. Fundamentally, militia comprises of native population and are not bound to serve anywhere else other than their hometown. In India, Viceroy Lord Curzon, (Ikram, 1965) introduced the militia and political agencies on frontier in 1901; however the very concept of militia underwent drastic changes in the aftermath of third Afghan War in 1919. Khyber Rifles was disbanded and North and South Waziristan Militia were transitioned into Scouts. On frontier, there were two militias which can be regarded militia in classic sense, one was Chitral Scouts raised in 1903 and other was Gilgit Scouts which was raised in 1913; it was an upgradation of Gilgit Levies. Militia by organisation comprised of only native soldiers enrolled from the republics, initial strength was 582 men, only a quarter were required to undergo annual training once a year for two months. Their pay was paid through the head of the locality, weapons and ammunition was the responsibility of the British government. Gilgit Scouts thus was divided into platoons, each platoon comprising of men from one specific area; all were Shia by faith and there was no soldier following sunni faith in Gilgit Scouts. (Frontier Corps, 1969).

Structurally, Gilgit scouts differed from a regular military unit in many aspects, first and foremost was the chain of command, Militia was under command to the political agent, who in majority of cases was also the commandant of Gilgit Scouts. Political agent as such was

responsible for the pay, allowances, enrolment, training and employment of Gilgit Scouts. Native men of distinction and standing were given the non-commissioned and junior commissioned officers ranks, notable includes the heir apparent to Gilgit, Subedar Major Babur Shah, all in all there were 15 such native officers on the eve of coup in Gilgit Scouts. In an army unit, there are at the minimum sixteen officers posted, however in militia, only four British officers were organisationally authorised.

Gilgit Scouts thus culturally was bonded, soldiers as they belong to the same area and enrolled on the recommendations of the notable, were more patriotic, loyal to their own kinsmen than to the spirit de corps as practiced in regular army. Another major difference from army was in the fact, that whereas regulars do not stay at one station for more than three-five years, the Gilgit Scouts never moved out from their area. This prolong stay not only makes a soldier more familiar with the area but also fosters bonds with his own people.

Relativist reconstruction of history

By 14th August 1947, almost 560 odd princely states had announced their accession to either dominion; India or Pakistan. Kashmir along with few other states including Hyderabad Deccan, Bahawalpur, Kalat and most importantly frontier states like Chitral, Dir, Swat, Hunza and Nagar remained independent.(Bangash, 2015. Jinnah Papers, 2000). This delay in accession of Kashmir was a matter of anxiety for both British and Pakistan officials. To British, the Kashmir was the lynchpin of Forward Policy, for Pakistan it was a *fait accompli* which was being inordinately delayed. British officers serving in Frontier Militias had made a contingency planning in such very scenario, their reason was not idealism but the very involvement in the

forward policy had made them so engrossed in the affair that they considered themselves as the history maker. Colonel R.N. Bacon was the commandant of Gilgit Scouts from 1943-1947 and it was he who earmarked and briefed Major Brown before handing him the command and he himself{Bacon}opted to serve Pakistan after transfer of power and was appointed as the political agent in Khyber Agency. Major Brown remained in touch with him throughout the turbulent period and it was him{Bacon}to whom Major Brown send the accession telegram Lieutenant Colonel Bacon had also served in North Waziristan Militia. {Cheema,2012}.

The defence committee meeting of 3rd October 1947, in which the governor and premier of North Western frontier Province{NWFP}along with the commander in chief and prime minister of Pakistan were in attendance , the issue of treaties and pacts with the tribes were discussed and it was decided to bring back the army from Waziristan, in the same meeting Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr Liaqat Ali Khan stated on the issue of treaty with Chitral ‘hold it, let me check the legality of Kashmir states control over the Chitral’(Jinnah Paper,) is a clear evidence of total ignorance of Pakistan’s political leadership regarding the strategic importance of Gilgit and surrounding states. This lack of understanding by the Pakistani politicians regarding the geostrategic position of the Gilgit, had compelled the Frontier Corps British officers to take the matter into their own hand. In first week of October 1947, the Muslim tribesmen attacked Kashmir State and almost reached the capital Srinagar, this was also inspired, guided, supported and armed by the Frontier Corps, without any orders from the government.^{xi} It is at this stage that the Operation Datta Khel was put into action by Major Brown. The unexpected turn or ‘fog of war’ came in the form of the Kashmir infantry battalion which was moved into the Gilgit . it had four Muslim Kashmiri officers also. Unknown to the British officials, these Muslim officers

were also planning to do something in the wake of the independence wrote Lieutenant Colonel Mirza Hassan, who himself was one of the officer.(Mirza,1979).

On 27th October 1947, when Maharaja of Kashmir signed the letter of accession^{xii} to India, mainly due to the tribal attack, thus this set into action the Operation Datta Khel .Major Brown^{xiii}, now acted as per planning

‘our object was to perform a coup d’etat in Gilgit with as little bloodshed and disturbance as possible, and then accede to Pakistan of our own accord... Pakistan would surely be as anxious as the British were to guard the northern frontiers against aggression and infiltration from Central Asia’^{xiv}.

Major Brown further writes .

‘The big question of the moment is which side of the fence is the Maharaja of Kashmir going to jump? if he has the sense to jump towards Pakistan good and well, but if he accedes to India the people here will not stand for it. There will be an upheaval of some sort, the question is what are we going to do ?are we going to support the Kashmir regime as we are duty bound to do so ?if we do, surely we shall be acting against our own democratic sentiments, which could never agree with the hundred thousand Muslim inhabitants of the Gilgit province being forced against their wills to become members of the Indian union, or shall we actively join and naturally lead the revolution in favour of Pakistan which will undoubtedly take place?’^{xv}

The coup went as per the planning in the midnight hour, the governor was arrested after a firing duel in which one scout was killed. The Kashmir infantry battalion was ambushed and blocked from reinforcing the besieged garrison at Gilgit. The involvement of Kashmir Muslim army officers was never planned and neither catered, nor they were taken into confidence for fear

of secrecy, thus , two coups took place simultaneously , one orchestrated by militia and other by army. Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Hasan Khan was the soul of army coup, he was as engrossed into history and romanticism as the Major Brown, thus it was more of a personality clash among them. The Kashmir army Muslim officers were able to dent the loyalty of scouts officers in the name of religion. In the immediate aftermath of coup, an accession signal was sent through lone wireless from Gilgit by the Major Brown, it was more of a confirmation of mission accomplished. The army mutineers now proclaimed a revolution , announcing the setting up of an independent Islamic republic of Gilgit. This was the most unexpected outcome of the coup. The Sikh army remnants also launched a small attack on the scouts but failed. The events in Gilgit were thus spread into two main, one taking place on more warlike area east of Indus (Chilas) and other on the west of Indus. Chilas is more Sunni populated thus the religious(mullah) declared Jihad with a declaration to kill all non muslims including Hindus, Sikhs and Christians; whereas in Gilgit it was merely to loot the non Muslims, which they did.

Gilgit remained in a chaotic situation till the third week of November when the first political agent Mr. Alam Khan arrived at Gilgit by air, however the revolutionary government refused to acknowledge his suzerainty , the revolutionary as they called themselves were relying upon the 6th Kashmir infantry battalion as power hub. During this period it was the Gilgit Scouts which remained loyal to their officers and through them the political agent was able to counter the pressure of revolutionary government. On 3rd December 1947, the Pakistan government in a meeting which was attended by Major brown also, agreed and decided to increase the strength of Scouts and also to promote certain Militia officers granting them commissions . It was at this stage that the full implication of what has occurred dawned upon the political government. Resultantly , two army officers were sent to Gilgit to take over the control from the revolutionary

government , which they were able to do so in the first week of January 1948. British officers were relieved and later a full scale war started in the Gilgit and Baltistan, in which the Pakistan was able to reach the outskirts of Kargil(same very town which in 1998 almost initiated a nuclear war in South Asia).

Conclusion.

The plan for a coup was planned and hatched at a lower level of officers which includes Lieutenant Colonel Bacon and Captain William Brown, probably Governor George Cunningham of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa province and Major General Scott serving in Kashmir forces had sympathetic view of the coup in Gilgit. Coup was an alternate plan in the event that Kashmir remains independent or joins India. Native officers serving in Kashmir forces and in Gilgit Scouts did not planned the coup from onset , rather they started taking interest in the affairs only after the posting in of the Major Brown in the Gilgit Scouts. There is no record or evidence which suggests that this coup had the backing of the Viceroy of India or the Prime Minister of United Kingdom.

The political governments of both dominions (Pakistan and India) were unaware of the strategic importance of the Gilgit, they were focussed on the main Kashmir without realising that without Gilgit, the land routes to Central Asia will be closed and blocked. India in this case had to and is still suffering from this strategic loss.


The declaration of independence by the Gilgit in the aftermath of the coup adds a new legal dimension to the complex legal scenario of Gilgit and Baltistan. The act itself disassociates

Gilgit from the Kashmir, thus the present connotation of India claiming Gilgit as part of Kashmir may not stand valid, as the natives had proclaimed independence through a military coup.

Major William Brown and his associates were never accorded or acknowledge in the official histories of Pakistan and Gilgit, mainly due to the fact that it contradicts its official stance of British being partisan to the India in the partition of subcontinent.

This coup and the events highlight the importance of agent affecting the structure. The act of agents like Brown, Bacon, Hassan and Scott have changed the geostrategic map of South and Central Asia

Map of Gilgit (Major William Brown, Gilgit Rebellion)



Notes

ⁱ The dictionary definition of 'militia' is a group of citizens who are organized or capable of providing paramilitary or policing service, namely: An army reserve composed of part-time soldiers (organized militia). A nation's able-bodied citizens who can be called upon to defend it (unorganized militia). A non-government military force (private or public militia).

ⁱⁱ Operation Datta Khel was the code name of coup d'état. Datta Khel is a small town in North Waziristan.

ⁱⁱⁱ Captain William Brown served in Tochi Scouts 1946-1947 in No .2 & No 1. Wing, he spent almost a month at Datta Khel. Brown was commissioned in a Frontier Force Regiment in 1941, transferred to SWS , served in Gilgit Scouts , came back to Tochi Scouts and then to Chitral Scouts and finally took the command of Gilgit Scouts after resigning his King's Commission.

^{iv} The British officers present in Sub Continent were given a choice of either joining the Pakistan or the India

^v In 1935 British India and Maharaja Harri Singh signed a lease under which Gilgit Agency {including Hunza} was taken on 60 years lease by the Raj, Gilgit Wazarat incorporates areas on the east and west of River Indus, whereas Gilgit Agency symbolises only area west of River Indus

^{vi} Political Agency were established on the North Western Frontier, first being Khyber Agency. A political officer was in charge who was in direct communication with Viceroy rather than the governor of province.

^{vii} Indian congress had polled more votes than rival political parties in the 1937 and 1946 general elections in India.

^{viii} Polo the favourite game in Gilgit, comprises of four Chukkers {halves} of seven minutes each.

^{ix} The only two routes from India to China passes through Kashmir, the most easterly is the Jammu from Katohra in the Gurdaspur District, rail link goes from Sialkot to Jammu and from here the movement towards Srinagar is possible in fair weather due to intervening Banihal Pass, the most common route is from Rawalpindi along River Jhelum to Srinagar and then to Gilgit via Bunji and onwards to China.

^x Frontier Corps was a coordinating headquarters established at Peshawar to liaison among the half a dozen militia corps on the North west Frontier. At present it is divided among Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces

^{xi} This has been ascertained through the classified documents and war diaries of Tochi Scouts, Khyber Rifles and Chitral Scouts.

^{xii} It was conditionally accepted by the Mountbatten. It is bit odd that Mountbatten did laid a condition, that plebiscite has to be held in the state to ascertain the will of people. However the Indian army troops were airlifted from Delhi to Srinagar and they not only secured the Srinagar Airfield but also wrested the initiative from the tribes.

^{xiii} Gilgit Rebellion written by Major William Brown the commandant of Scouts was published in 1994, almost ten years after Brown's death and its preface admits that 'few pages have been omitted' . Moreover the original copy of the draft typed in 1949 was lost and book was printed basing upon a carbon copy .

^{xiv} Ibid,p,115.

^{xv} Ibid,p,145.

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